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The state of the U.S. agricultural  economy has become a major con-
cern to both the  Administration  and Congress.  With the U.S.  losing
market share in a declining export market and with protectionist pres-
sures increasing around the world, it becomes more and more difficult
for the U.S. to maintain its free trade stance.
Unfortunately,  attempts by the  U.S.  to  convince  our trading part-
ners to share in the international  market responsibility have not been
satisfactory.  Several  initiatives to improve  both the domestic and the
U.S. export market situation have been undertaken.
First,  in  response  to international  debt  and  declining  purchasing
power the authority to provide credit guarantees for agricultural  com-
modity exports under the GSM-102 program was  increased from  $2.8
billion to $4.8  billion and is likely to increase  further.
Second, to meet the competition in a variety of markets the blended
credit program  was developed  and to demonstrate  our seriousness  in
objecting to EC export subsidy  practices the U.S.  used  a direct agri-
cultural export subsidy for a selected targeted market - wheat flour
to Egypt.  While the preference for free and  open markets for  agricul-
tural products  as well  as for  non-agricultural  products  remains,  the
alternatives to EC subsidies  was to accept not only  depressed  export
sales  due  to  a  declining  international  market,  but also  a  declining
share of that smaller market  if we  continued alone to curtail produc-
tion and resist  protectionism.  Recently  a sale  of 18 thousand metric
tons of butter and  10 thousand tons of cheese  to Egypt was announced.
Other  actions of a  similar nature  have  been proposed.  We  hope they
will  not be  necessary, but we  are  keeping  our options  open.  On the
domestic  side, the U.S. has had an acreage reduction program and an
acreage  diversion  program  to reduce  production.  In addition,  a pay-
ment-in-kind  program  to reduce  the surplus  stocks  overhanging the
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159market  and  to  reduce  government  stockholding  costs  was  imple-
mented.
The U.S. Congress  is in a mood to do more, particularly with respect
to the  export  market.  While  Congress  has passed  no  legislation  af-
fecting agricultural  exports to date, many proposals are being consid-
ered.  It is difficult at the moment to predict what will result from the
interplay  of forces presently  acting in the U.S.  Congress.
On the one hand are those calling for strong measures to protect the
domestic market, and to do whatever is necessary to become once again
competitive in the international market and regain market shares lost
to subsidized  and unfair competitive  practices. On the other hand are
those who  want the U.S.  to remain  true to the  free trade philosophy
and to continue to adhere  strictly  to the principles of trade based on
comparative  advantage.  Each  side  is asking the  other, "At what cost
do  we follow your alternative?"
The European  Community has*tried from time to time to find ways
to  restrict  oilseeds  or  increase  the  consumption  of grains.  They  are
trying  again now with a proposal  to subsidize the use of Community-
grown  grains  and  oilseeds  and  a  proposal  to  put  a tax  on  sales  of
vegetable  oil.
In  general,  the  trading rules  of the  General  Agreement  on  Trade
and Tarriffs (GATT) prohibit the use of nontariff measures to restrict
trade.  However,  there  are  many  exceptions  including  some  of those
just  mentioned.  Restrictions  are  permitted  to protect  human,  plant,
and animal health. Subsidies are recognized as necessary for a number
of purposes, although  subsidies on exports of agricultural products are
to be avoided whenever possible.  (There  is no outright prohibition  on
subsidies  of unprocessed  products.)  Restrictions  on  imports  are  per-
mitted to support domestic farm programs,  if those programs in turn
are to restrict domestic  production.
Many countries  do not live up to these rules. When  the U.S.  could
not meet them, other GATT members gave us a waiver from our GATT
obligations.  Other countries,  however,  simply act  illegally.  The  U.S.
is now challenging  a number  of import quotas that Japan has main-
tained for years. The Europeans protect their most important products
with variable  import levies,  a type  of measure  which was not known
in 1948 and which the Community claims is therefore not covered  by
the GATT rules.
The last round of trade negotiations,  the Tokyo Round which ended
in 1979,  was  conceived  at the beginning of 1972  when  the European
Community and Japan agreed to such negotiations as part of an agree-
ment in which the U.S. devalued  the dollar. In the Tokyo Round,  for
the first time in many years, a major attempt was made to bring GATT
rules up to date and expand them in many areas, including subsidies,
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others.
The two  most important  areas  of agriculture  were the agreements
or  codes  on  subsidies  and  standards.  The  Standards  Code has  been
very helpful in requiring countries to announce in advance when they
plan to change import or internal standards  and be willing to receive
public  comment on the changes.
However,  the Standards Code has been much less successful  in the
area  of dispute  settlement  because  the  Europeans  and  others  have
refused to allow the agreed dispute settlement procedure  to be applied
to the kind of health and sanitary issues involved in meat inspection.
In their view, the  code does not deal with the conditions under which
a product  is produced,  but deals only with the specifications  - grade,
size, etc. - of the product  itself.
The Subsidies  Code also poses a major problem. GATT rules do not
prohibit the use of export subsidies on primary agricultural products,
but do say they should not be used when they result in the exporting
country's obtaining more than an equitable share of world trade.
The negotiators  of the Subsidies  Code  hoped that they could make
this concept more precise so that some subsidies at least could be ruled
out. The  code does provide  some definitions  of equitable share, which
are intended to prohibit a subsidizing country from displacing another
country  in a given market  or from price undercutting.
The U.S.  has now invested two years in testing the Subsidies  Code
with  specific cases.  The results have  convinced us that new rules are
necessary.  The basic  situation remains  the same as it was before the
Tokyo Round, namely, the rules aim at limiting damage from subsidies
rather  than  limiting  subsidies  themselves.  Even  with the  stronger
rules under the Subsidies Code,  damage is not easily proved.
Further,  the GATT is not a tribunal. It is instead a group  of coun-
tries all of whom have an interest in the subsidy question. As a result,
the procedures have taken much longer than foreseen and the findings
are not clear-cut.
Most of our test cases have  involved the European Community.  We
have  been  engaged  throughout  this  process  in  intensive  discussions
with the European Community  to try to reach  a new understanding
with which  we  can  both agree.  Since the  Community  is  the world's
largest user of direct  agricultural  export  subsidies,  the Community's
only interest in restricting use of subsidies would be if subsidy actions
by the  U.S.  and others  are  sufficiently  costly  to the  Community to
make an agreement desirable.  When the U.S. takes such actions there
is a natural concern that we may be headed for a trade war.
A trade war is never our objective.  Negotiation  is the usual way of
avoiding one. The real U.S. objective is to negotiate a workable subsidy
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tries and,  in the process,  assure  that  U.S.  exporters  can  compete  in
markets  when  they  are  confronted  by the  unfair  trade  practices  of
others.
U.S.-EC  Bilateral Talks
This principle of negotiation  was behind the recently  completed  six
months  of U.S.-EC  high  level  consultations,  which  commenced  after
the GATT Ministerial of November  1982. Unfortunately,  after all the
talk ended,  we were  unable to point to any substantial  results. While
the discussions were constructive,  there was little progress in moving
toward  greater discipline regarding  export subsidy practices.
Even the small positive results that came from the talks were tem-
porary. For example, the EC commitment  to limit soft wheat and flour
exports to the previous year's level was only for the 1982/83 marketing
year.
Less substantive  but of longer term  was an agreement  on  a formal
bilateral  information  exchange  program  on  agricultural  trade  and
market developments. This was so both sides would have more detailed
and timely  information  on factors which could lead to potential trade
conflicts.
Vulnerability of Agricultural Trade
In  assessing the alternatives  being proposed it is important  to rec-
ognize that international agricultural trade has been and continues to
be particularly vulnerable  to the protectionist actions  of nations.  Ag-
ricultural trade  is particularly  vulnerable  to protectionist  actions  for
three primary reasons.
(1)  All nations desire to be as self-sufficient  in food as their resources
will permit.  Most governments  want to nurture their food production
systems and support their farmers to  encourage production.
(2) Agricultural  production cannot adjust quickly to fluctuations  in
demand. Its production cycles  are measured  in months  and years, not
days  or weeks. To  protect farmers,  all governments  drift into  protec-
tionist actions.
(3)  Largely  because  of the first  two  factors,  the world  community
has never faced up to the difficult task of establishing workable rules
for agricultural  trade.
No round of multilateral trade negotiations,  since GATT was estab-
lished,  has treated  agricultural  trade  as  much  more  than  an  after-
thought.
While  steps were  being  taken  in the  Dillon,  Kennedy,  and  Tokyo
rounds to reduce tariffs and control  subsidies in manufactured  goods,
groups  were  formed  to  "study  and  recommend"  solutions  to  agricul-
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tural trade issues remain "under study" today.
We are paying a heavy price for those years of neglect - in desta-
blized trade, in rising discord in trade relationships, in low farm prices,
and rising government  costs.
Fingers  are  being pointed  in  all directions,  accusations  are  made,
and petitions filed  with the GATT  as to  who  is doing what to  whom
in agricultural  trade.  No country  is  immune,  but the most attention
and the sharpest rhetoric has been generated  by the trade differences
between  the U.S. and the European  Community.
This  is  not  surprising.  Together,  we  account  for  about half of all
agricultural  trade;  we are  good  customers  for each  other,  and at  the
same time we are strong competitors.  Fortunately,  we have toned down
the  rhetoric.  But  the  issues  remain.  The  U.S.  and the  Community
arrived  at this point by taking different routes to the same objective
-that  of a stable income  for our farmers with a fair return for their
capital  and labor.  The  Community,  in  1957,  chose  a system  of high,
protected support prices to encourage production toward what seemed
a far-off dream of food  self-sufficiency,  with a system of export subsi-
dies to move surplus  production onto the world market.
The  U.S.,  after years  of rigid controls  and troublesome  surpluses,
moved  toward  a  market-oriented  farm  policy  in the  1960s  and  com-
pleted the transition  for most commodities  in 1973.
Both systems  worked  well.  Strong  global  economic  growth during
the  1970s  and  severe  production  shortfalls  among  major  importers
combined  to generate  unprecedented  growth  in import  demand  and
export opportunities.  The U.S. and the Community shared in this growth.
The growth helped the U.S. ease  out of its costly farm programs  and
the Community  to dispose  of the  surpluses  generated  by high price
supports.  U.S.  farm  exports  grew  21  percent  per  year  in value  and
those of the Community  to third countries rose at an even faster rate.
In turn,  both the  Community  and the  U.S.  have  become  heavily
dependent on  exports. We must export 25 percent of our farm produc-
tion just to maintain farm prices at the  levels set by the Agriculture
and Food Act  of 1981.  The  Community  must export 20  percent of its
farm products  to dispose of the surplus generated by its rising support
prices.
Since 1980, world agricultural trade has changed dramatically.  World
agricultural  trade  growth  in  the  1980s  has  averaged  less  than  1.5
percent per year in volume terms  compared with a growth of four to
five percent  in the  1970s. Trade in grain has actually declined. Record
or near record world crops combined with the decline in trade produced
huge  supplies and a drastic drop in farm commodity prices.
The responses of the U.S. and the European  Community  to the slump
in world demand have been  dramatically different.  With world trade
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output  records  thus  far  in the  1980s. It  also  stepped  up  its  subsidy
program.  EC exports to markets outside the Community have set rec-
ords for three years in a row. EC stocks are relatively unchanged, and
producer  prices have  been unaffected by world events.
In contrast, U.S. agricultural exports dropped last fiscal year for the
first time in  13  years, and they  will be down  again this year.  Stocks
are up  and would rise again but for government-financed  acreage  re-
ductions and drought.
The results  of those differing responses  have been the same in one
respect  - a  sharp  increase  in  government  costs.  In the  U.S.,  farm
support costs have tripled  in two  years.  In the  Community,  agricul-
tural expenditures are at or near the limit of spending authority, pushed
by export subsidies expected  to total nine billion  European  Currency
Units this year,  50 percent  over  1982.
So here we are, the world's leading agricultural traders, both drain-
ing our treasuries - one to increase exports, the other to offset export
decline.  And we can't seem to  agree  on what to  do about it. The U.S.
believes  that the market,  not  governments,  should bear  the  cost  of
trade.  We  believe that market forces,  not government,  should  be the
primary influence  on the movement of trade.
We  believe a system  of disciplined agricultural  trade, based  on the
principle of comparative  advantage, offers the best use of agricultural
resources for the benefit of producers  and consumers alike - a system
in which  government's  main  role  is  to assure  the production adjust-
ments necessary  for balance  in global supply  and demand.
The events of the recent past show more clearly than ever that this
approach cannot be  unilateral. And they also  show that, in an inter-
dependent trading world, dichotomous  policies  among traders  can be
painfully  expensive  - almost  $15 billion estimated for farm supports
in the  Community  this year,  not  counting  individual  member state
supports, and about  $21 billion in the U.S.
Our concern  in the U.S.  is not the  $15 billion that the Community
will spend for its farmers - it is Community  money.  Our concern  is
with the share of that money that goes to pay for  export subsidies -
we are paying part of that cost. We cannot lay all of our export decline
at the door of the European Community.  The appreciation of the dollar,
slack demand,  and other factors bear on the decline. But Community
export  subsidies have hurt  U.S. farmers and those in other countries
as well.
U.S. Department of Agriculture analysts calculate that Community
trade programs  now displace  $9 billion a year in world trade in prod-
ucts  of interest  to  the  U.S.  - 14  million  tons  of grains  and  grain
products  and two to three million tons of livestock products.
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of $6 billion a year, and that translates into a loss to U.S.  farmers  of
$2 to $3 billion in net farm income and an increase of $1  to $2 billion
in U.S. government payments.  If production and trade  conditions  are
unchanged over  the next three to four years,  our analysis shows that
U.S. export losses to Community subsidies are likely to reach $8 billion
a year  by  1987.  In  this situation,  the temptation  in  Washington  to
meet this kind of competition  by taking measures  of our  own might
be contrary  to our policy of liberal trade.
The  U.S.  is  spending  billions this year  to  take  grain  land  out  of
production,  while Community acreage  is little changed, with the sur-
plus from the harvest destined largely  for subsidized export.
The  U.S. this year will spend $74.8 million on storage to keep sur-
plus dairy products  off the world market.  The Community has appro-
priated  $1.9  billion to subsidize the export  of surplus  butter,  cheese,
and nonfat dry milk into export.
The  U.S.  has not raised its dairy support prices  since  1980  and  is
working in the Congress to get them reduced. In the same period, dairy
price supports in the Community have  been increased by 23 percent.
The strong trade position of the Community today - first in exports
of sugar,  dairy,  and poultry, second in beef and veal, third in wheat
- is far different from its position 25 years ago. And all are based on
a strategy of high internal support prices  and large export subsidies.
EC trade policies today have a worldwide impact, and they produce
a worldwide reaction. Brazil, Argentina, and Canada are trying to stay
price competitive with measures of their own - export subsidies, prices
controlled  at below market  levels,  and other measures.  As we might
expect, we are seeing a growing and alarming  dependence on govern-
ment treasuries to determine the flow of trade. There must be a better
way.
Those of us who looked forward to the GATT Ministerial as the time
to face  up to the inadequacies  of the Subsidies  Code and other rules
for agricultural  trade are disappointed. And even though it is not only
the  EC  with  which  we  differ,  the  U.S.  and  the EC  have  a  special
responsibility to point the way to long-term, stable, sustainable growth
in agricultural trade.
The Push for Fairer Trade
Why do we  push so hard for  freer, fairer trade? It certainly would
be easier,  in light of the efforts we expend trying to make our trading
partners more responsible,  if we just did as most of our trading part-
ners  do.  So  why  do  we  persist?  The  reasons  are  partly  a  matter  of
principle,  but mostly  pragmatic economics.
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the way for the most efficient use of agricultural resources  in a world
of rising populations and increasing interdependence.
Each nation,  according to the theory of comparative  advantage, should
produce  for the world market those products  it does so best and most
efficiently.  Producing  food  and  fiber products  is  a job that should  be
done  most  efficiently.  It  is  in  the  interest  of all  nations  to  use  the
earth's resources  - which  are  finite  - as  efficiently  as  possible  to
provide for the basic needs of all peoples.
Trade barriers  work against the  efficient  production  and  distribu-
tion of agricultural  products.  We are concerned  by measures  increas-
ingly taken by some countries to insulate and stabilize their food supplies
at the expense  of the orderly  movement of trade.
Where  our government  is not successful  in freeing up trade, or re-
moving obstacles, or reducing  foreign export subsidies, we do not plan
to sit  idly  by.  And  there  are  signs  of change,  indications  that  this
message  is beginning to get through.
In the final analysis,  the problem  and its solution is much broader
than just agriculture.  World economic recovery and the strengthening
of international  agricultural  markets  that  would  result  would  go  a
long way  toward making the present problems and issues disappear.
In the meantime,  everything possible must be done to keep the inter-
national  market open  and free  and to resist further  protectionist  ac-
tions,  or we run  the risk of repeating  the mistakes  of the  1930s.  The
U.S.,  however,  cannot and will not travel the free trade path alone. It
is time  for us collectively  to choose our agricultural trade destiny.
Trade  policy  today  is  an  international  activity.  To  be  effective,  it
must be matched  in each  country with  domestic  programs that facil-
itate the international  flow  of commodities  - rather than have  gov-
ernments themselves competing  for those same commodities.  The ability
to  export  depends  on matching  internal  policies  to  world  markets.
Placing this principle  in effect in all countries would remove  much of
the conflict in trade relationships  and in world markets.
We  remain  hopeful that trade  issues can  be  resolved  via negotia-
tions. This  is our objective  in pressing for discussions  on the subsidy
code.  Such discussions can  remove  some of the antagonisms that cur-
rently affect our bilateral relations. An agreement on a tighter subsidy
code could set in motion a more  favorable  climate  for years to  come.
This certainly  seems worth  the full  effort  of both the United  States
and the European Community.
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